State of Utah v. Joan Marie Gorlick : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
State of Utah v. Joan Marie Gorlick : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Stanley S. Adams; Attorney for Appellant;
Robert B. Hansen; Attorney General;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Gorlick, No. 16420 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1731
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent,: 
vs. Case No. 16420 
JOAN MARIE GORLICK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal From the Judgment Entered In the Third 
Judicial District Court, In and For Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, The Honorable David B. 
Dee, Judge 
STANLEY S. ADAMS, ESQ. 
Suite 1004 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
F ff r:- D ·---
r 1979 :,1 '~' 
Clerk, Supreme Coun, .... ; .. h 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent,: 
VS. Case No. 16420 
JOAN MARIE GORLICK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal From the Judgment Entered In the Third 
Judicial District Court, In and For Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, The Honorable David B. 
ROBERT B. HA~SE~ 
Attorney General 
2'6 State Ca~itol Building 
Salt lake City, Utah 84114 
Dee, Judge 
STANLEY S. ADAMS, ESQ. 
Suite 1004 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE..................................... 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.................................. 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . • 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CONVICTION 
BECAUSE THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE 
CRIME IS FROM A FULLY DISCREDITED WITNESS, UNWORTHY OF 
BELIEF, WHOSE TESTIMONY COULD NOT SUPPORT A CONVICTION 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . . . . . • • . . 9 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT TOOK THE PROPERTY 
ALLEGED WITH THE INTENT REQUIRED TO CONVICT FOR THEFT ....•.• 14 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO 
ESTABLISH APPELLANT'S GUILT OF SECOND DEGREE FELONY 
THEFT ............................................••.•••..... 17 
CONCLUSION...................................................... 20 
TABLE OF CASES 
I n r e W i r. s h i p , 3 9"7 U • S • 3 58 ( 19 7 0 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
Jackson v. Virginia, _U.S. __ , 47 L.W. 4883 (1979)........... 11 
Mesaros'' v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956) ................ 12,13,14 
Oldham v. The State, 534 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1975) .............•..••. 18 
People' \" . Kolego, 554 P.2d 712 (Co1o.App. 1976) ................. 18 
State v. Bechtold, ll Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183 (1960) ......•.•• 10 
State v. Bender, 581 P. 2d 1019 (Utah 197 8) .....................• 16 
State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978) ...................... 11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 146 (1960) ............ . 
State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977) ..............•......... 
State v. McKee, 17 Utah 488, 58 Pac. 1119 (1898) ...........•.... 
State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908 (Utah 1978) ................. . 
State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975) ••.•.......•........... 
State v. Patterson, 110 Utah 413, 174 P. 2d 843 (1946) .......... . 
State in the Interest of R.G.B., P. 2d (Utah 1979) ....... . 
State v. Ross, 107 Ariz. 240, 485 P.2d 810 (1971) •......•....... 
State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957) .......... . 
State v. Taylor, 570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977) ...................... . 
State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d 865 (1959) ...••.......... 
Wise v. The State, 494 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973) ......... . 
STATUTES 
Model Penal Code Tentative Draft ll 1, pp. 69-73 ( 1956) ......... . 
Model Penal Code, §223.0(1) ......•.•.•.•........................ 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
76-6-101, Penal Code •.••.............•...........•.......... 
76-6-401 (3) ....•.••••...................................... 15 
76-6-403 ....•.••............•••.•........................... 
76-6-404 ........••.................................... 1 '14' 15 
76-6-412 (a) •.........•.•.•.•.•.............................. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Clark and Marshall, Crimes, 7th Ed. § 12.04, p. 825 ............ . 
LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law, p. 637 ......................... . 
Perkins, Criminal Law, 2nd ed. p. 266 .......................... . 
Utah's New Penal Code: Theft, 1973 Utah L.Rev. 718 ............. . 
i i 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOAN MARIE GORLICK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16420 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant, Joan Marie Gorlick, appeals from a judgment of con-
viction of theft in violation of §76-6-404, U.C.A., 1953, on jury 
trial in the District Court, Third Judicial District, the Honorable 
David B. Dee, Judge. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELO~ 
The appellant was charged by complaint on the 2nd day of August, 
1978, with the crime of theft of property over $1000, a second 
degree felony, in violation of §76-6-404, U.C.A., 1953 (R. 11). 
After preliminary hearing an information on the charge was filed on 
Octo::,er 25, 1978 (R. 13). The case was tried in the Third Judicial 
District, Salt Lake County, on January 8, 1979, on jury trinl, the 
Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, presiding (R. 18). On January 9, 
1979, the JUry returned a verdict of guilty (R. 45). On March 23, 
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1979, the appellant was sentenced and placed on probation for two 
years and fined $1000.00 (R. 56). Appeal was timely taken from U 
judgment on April 13, 1979, (R. 58). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks reversal and dismissal of the charge or 
reduction to a lesser degree of theft. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The information in the instant case charged the appellant witr 
theft of the property of David Delgado having a value in excess of 
$1000.00 and occurring in Salt Lake County on August l, 1978 (R. : 
The State's case was based essentially on the testimony of thE 
alleged victim, David Delgado. Delgado testified that he saw the 
appellant, Joan Marie Gorlick, at the Room-At-The-Top at the Hiltc 
Hotel in Salt Lake City, on August 1, 1978 (R. 84). Delgado was 
then having a drink with a friend (R. 84). Ms. Gorlick arrived ....,; 
some friends and sat at another table (R. 84). The other persons 
with appellant were Paul Tolman and Calvin Smith (R. 85). Delgadc 
sent over a couple of drinks to Ms. Gorlick and her friends and 
eventually joined her at her table (R. 85). This was about 4:00 
p.m. (R. 85). The group continued drinking and socializing at the 
Hilton until about 10:30 p.m. (R. 85). Delgado was a twenty-year 
old, admitted homosexual (R. 92, 98) who had previously made the 
acquaintance of the appellant, and Ms. Gorlick had, on a previous 
occasion, stayed at Delgado's grandparents' home in Scottsdale, 
Arizona (R. 93). There had, at that time, been som<: discussion of 
-2-
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job for Delgado in Salt Lake City at a lingerie shop in conjunction 
with appellant (R. 93.). 
The appellant had a gold bar and chain jewelry piece in Arizona 
which Delgado admired and appellant had it with her at the Hilton 
(R. 94, 95). Delgado had even borrowed the jewelry item on a prior 
occasion (R. 96). Delgado had a aiamond ring containing seven 
diamonds which he valued between $300- $700 (R. 100). There also 
seemed to be some dislike of appellant by Delgado over the job 
matter previously discussed (R. 96). 
Delgado was interested in buying the gold bar, and appellant was 
a jewelry and diamond dealer with some experience . There were also 
discussions concerning Delgado's ring (R. 99). Ms. Gorlick could 
not put a value on the ring (R. 99). Prices had gone up, although 
Delgado had paid only $250 for the ring, wholesale, four years 
previous (R. 101). A value of between $300 and $700 was discussed 
between Delgado and appellant (R. 100). According to Delgado, he 
was willing to pay $500 for appellant's "bar and chain" (R. 102). 
Delgado admitted there was some discussion about taking his ring and 
having it appraised against the gold bar and chain (R. 104). Appel-
lant had possession of Delgado's ring at the Hilton for about one 
and a half hours according to Delgado (R. 104). Delgado also showed 
the ring to Cal Smith and Paul Tolman (R. 103). 
According to Delgado, the group eventually left the Hilton and 
went to the Sun Tavern on the west side of Salt Lake City (R. 86). 
More drinks w~re had by Delgado at the Sun Tavern. Delgado testi-
fied that at one point during the evening, he was ready to write a 
-3-
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$500 check for appellant's gold bar and chain. Delgado said Gorli 
wanted to have the ring appraised and would return it "first thins 
in the morning" (R. 87). Delgado said he declined. Apparently at 
the Sun Tavern, the discussion continued concerning the ring. Ms. 
Gorlick, at one point, according to Delgado, had the ring and it 
fell in a drink and appellant swallowed it (R. 87). Delgado then 
got up and called the police (R. 88). Jacquelyn Jo Kunst, a wait-
ress at the Sun Tavern who resided in the same apartment as Delgac 
(R. 110), testified the party had been "drinking" and "messing 
around" (R. 132). When Delgado told her appellant had swallowed 
ring, Kunst looked at the appellant and said "did you?" and 
according to Kunst, Gorlick shook her head "yes" (R. 132). Kunst 
admitted there was no such verbal statement from appellant (R. 14: 
and that she could have had ice cubes or a drink in her mouth (R. 
140). Kunst also said she saw jewelry being shown around and tha· 
when the group left no one "ran out" (R. 141). 
According to Delgado, the incident when Gorlick allegedly swa 
lowed the ring occurred at about 12:00 a.m. (R. 110). When the 
police came, Delgado reported the theft of his ring, and, in addi· 
tion, falsely accused Cal Smith, appellant's companion, of taking 
another ring from him. In fact, the other ring reported stolen ~· 
Cal Smith's own property (R. 91), which Delgado eventually acmitt• 
(R. 91): 
"A. I also claimed Mr. Smith's ring. 
Q. Oh. Explain what you mean by that? 
A. Okay. I claimed his ring as being mine, for I don't kno. 
just a way of having revenge on the three parties. 
-4-
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Q. Did you report to them that he had stolen that ring? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q. And in fact it was not your ring? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Why did you do that? 
A. Just my way of getting revenge." 
He also made the false accusation (R. 106): 
"A. Because I knew once Joan was arrested with the ring it 
would be held for evidence for quite some time, so I fig-
ured I'll just have his held at the same time for a 
reassurance that the Court case would go." 
Delgado admitted starting drinking at a bar called The Rail, 
went to the Hilton, where he drank from a bottle of Jack Daniels 
whiskey which he bought, and then at the Sun Tavern (R. 108). 
According to Delgado, he drank at least three fourths of a pint of 
v.·hiskey (R. 97). Others testified Delgado drank more. 
After the police were called, they located appellant at her car 
at the Hilton where she was arrested and the ring taken from her 
purse (R. 1501. 
Milton Peterson, an employee of Schubach Jewelry, testified as 
an expert for the prosecution. He placed the value of the ring in 
question at between $1200 and $1400, full retail price, on August 1, 
1978 (R. 1271. He never did directly address the question presented 
to him ac to market value between a willing seller and a willing 
buyer at the place of the theft (R. 127). He placed the value on 
the ring for a large buyer, "keystone value", at around five or six 
hundred dollars (R. 128). 
-5-
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The evidence for the defense showed Delgado harbored some sor 
of distorted attitude towards Ms. Gorlick. James K. Opp of Barb. 
Models had employed Delgado for a few months as a male director 
165). Delgado told Mr. Opp that he, Delgado, was an undercover 
federal agent and that he was investigating Ms. Gorlick for drug 
activities (R. 172). Delgado denied ever making a statement con-
cerning appellant to anyone at Barbizon, but did admit searching 
a picture of her while employed there (R. 248). 
Calvin G. Smith had been one of the persons with Ms. Gorlick 
Mr. Delgado on August 1, 1978 (R. 184, 185). According to Mr. 
Smith, he owed Ms. Gorlick certain small gem stones which he too· 
the Hilton to give to her (R. 185, 186). Smith was wearing a ri· 
which Delgado admired while they were at the Hilton (R. 126). 
Delgado told Smith when he sat at their table that Delgado had b' 
drinking Jack Daniels whiskey all day (R. 186). Delgado also tc. 
Smith that he, Delgado, had just got out of the alcoholic ward c 
the hospital and had been drinking and taking drugs -- "uppers" 
186). Smith testified that during the evening Delgado wanted tc 
trade his ring for Ms. Gorlick's necklace, and that appellant wa· 
to take the ring to have it appraised and that Delgado allowed~· 
Gorlick to take the ring to have it appraised (R. 188). Smith r. 
told Delgado that Smith believed the ring to be worth between $2 
and $300. Mr. Smith had been in the diamond business (R. 186). 
After the group was at the Hilton, Delgado suggested going to th 
Sun Tavern. Delgado said he was having his car fixed (R. 190) s 
Smith, Gorlick and Delgado went in one car and Paul Tolman in hi 
-6-
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own. It later turned out that Delgado, in fact, had left his car 
somewhere and it was not being fixed (R. 120, 192). Smith said he 
never heard anything from Delgado about Ms. Gorlick swallowing 
Delgado's ring (R. 191). Later, Smith was arrested on Delgado's 
false accusation that Smith had taken a ring from Delgado, when, in 
fact, the ring he allegedly took was Smith's ring (R. 193). It was 
over one and a half months before Smith received his own ring back 
(R. 193). Even though Delgado had falsely accused Smith that night, 
possibly because Delgado was drunk, he repeated the accusation to 
the pol ice the next day when he was sober (R. 121). Delgado 
admitted: 
"Q. Cal Smith went to jail because you lied? 
A. Yes, Cal Smith went to jail because I lied." (R. 121). 
Delgado testified he called the police at the Sun Tavern and 
took down the license number of appellant (R. 117-119). Smith nor 
Tolman heard him say he was going to call the police nor heard him 
make such a call (R. 195, 209). 
Paul Kim Tolman was also with appellant, Smith and Delgado at 
tne Hilton on the day and night in question. He testified Delgado 
came over to the table where he, Smith and Gorlick had been and that 
there was discussion about jewelry (R. 203). Tolman said Delgado 
had a fifth of Jack Daniels whiskey which he was drinking (R. 204), 
and that a trade of the necklace of appellant for the ring of 
Delgado was discussed and a figure was discussed of around $250 for 
the ring (R. 204). Tolman also heard Delgado talking about being in 
the hospital and taking drugs (R. 205). Tolman testified that 
-7-
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Delgado gave appellant Delgado's ring to have it appraised (R. 20' 
and that Ms. Gorlick put the ring in her purse to take it to have 
appraised (R. 206). Tolman said he never heard any conversations 
the Sun Tavern about Ms. Gorlick swallowing Delgado's ring or abo 
Delgado calling the police (R. 208, 209). In Tolman's opinion, 
Delgado was the only person drunk (R. 210). 
Ms. Gorlick testified that she was single and the mother of 
children (R. 215). She had known Delgado in Phoenix, Arizona, an· 
had stayed at his grandparents' home (R. 216, 218). On the eveni· 
in question, Delgado joined the table where Joan Gorlick and her 
friends were (R. 215). Delgado had admired her necklace and want' 
to buy it (R. 219) and had worn it in Phoenix (R. 219). While at 
the Hilton, Delgado wanted to buy her necklace or trade it for hi: 
ring (R. 220). Delgado appeared quite intoxicated and she asked 
Delgado to let her take the ring to have it appraised (R. 221). 
According to appellant, that was agreed on (R. 221). The value o: 
Ms. Gorlick's necklace was put at $500 (R. 221). Ms. Gorlick too· 
possession of the ring, and Delgado gave it to her to keep until· 
following day in order to have it appraised (R. 222). Delgado al' 
told Ms. Gorlick that he had just checked out of the Holy Cross 
Hospital where he was being treated for alcoholism and that he ha: 
taken some amphetamines (R. 223). Appellant also observed uelgadc 
had a fifth of Jack Daniels which he was drinking (R. 223). Afte: 
being at the Hilton, the party went to the Sun Tavern (R. 224). 
According to Ms. Gorlick, there was no conversation at the Sun abc 
the ring. Delgado became upset when Ms. Gorlick refused to 
-8-
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take Delgado around town (R. 225). Later on when Ms. Gorlick was 
arrested, she first was apprehensive and said she didn't know 
Delgado-- later, she told the officer the ring was in her purse (R. 
229) • 
Based on the above facts, a judgment of conviction was entered. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CONVICTION BECAUSE 
THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME IS 
FROM A FULLY DISCREDITED WITNESS, UNWORTHY OF BELIEF, WHOSE 
TESTHlONY COULD NOT SUPPORT A CONVICTION BEYOND A REASON-
ABLE DOUBT. 
The appellant submits that evidence is insufficient to convict 
on the charge because the only evidence that would support a con-
elusion that the appellant took the ring in question without per-
mission came from a fully discredited and untrustworthy witness. 
The evidence was uncontradicted that appellant and Delgado had known 
each other previously. Delgado had admired appellant's gold-bar 
necklace and wanted to buy it or trade for it. Delgado, by his own 
testimony, indicated he let Ms. Gorlick have his ring and examine it 
while they were socializing. The dispute in the evidence centers 
around whether appellant let Ms. Gorlick take the ring to have it 
appraised so that its value could be contrasted against the assumed 
value of the necklace which was put at $500, or whether Ms. Gorlick 
took it without permission. Delgado admitted Ms. Gorlick had wanted 
to take the ring and have it appraised (R. 113). According to 
Delgado, Ms. Gorlick obtaine0 the ring when it dropped into her 
drink and she said she sv;a] lowed it (R. 88). According to Ms. 
-9-
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Gorlick, Mr. Smith and Mr. Tolman, the only other persons present, 
Mr. Delgado had given the ring to Ms. Gorlick to have it appraised 
(R. 188, 204, 222). Ms. Gorlick put the ring in her purse for tha 
purpose. The ring was found in the purse by the police. 
Under usual standards of review, it might be said that the fac 
present a jury question and that reversal would not be in order. 
State v. Mills, 530 P. 2d 1272 (Utah 1975), this Court stated the 
rule of review concerning a verdict challenged on the grounds of 
insufficiency of evidence: 
"It is the prerogative of the jury to judge the weight 
of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, and the 
facts to be found therefrom. For a defendant to prevail 
upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain his conviction, it must appear that viewing the 
evidence and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn 
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict of 
the jury, reasonable minds could not believe him guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. To set aside a verdict it must 
appear that the evidence was so inconclusive or unsatis-
factory that reasonable minds acting fairly must have 
entertained reasonable doubt that defendant committed the 
crime. Unless the evidence compels such conclusion as a 
matter of law, the verdict must be sustained." 
See also, State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (195~ 
State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d 865 (1959); State v. Danks, 
10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 146 (1960); State v. Bechtold, 11 Utah 2d 
208, 357 P.2d 183 (1960); State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908 (Utah 
1978); State in the Interest of R.G.B., P.2d (Utah 1979). 
However, in this case it is submitted the only evidence for th· 
prosecution was from a thoroughly discredited source which, when 
weighed against the testimony corroborating the appellant's versio· 
of the incident, requires the conclusion that the verdict of the 
jury was, under the circumstances, wholly unreasonable. 
-]0-
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The appellant has a right to have every factual element of the 
offense established beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 
u.s. 358 (1970); Jackson v. Virginia, u.s. I 47 L.W. 4883 
( 1979). If the evidence for the prosecution is discredited and 
unworthy of belief, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
is not established. Under such circumstances "reasonable minds 
could not believe [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah 1978). 
In the instant case, the testimony of Delgado is wholly unworthy 
of belief. First, he admitted he lied to the police and falsely 
accused Cal Smith of stealing a ring as a part of the same incident 
in which he accused Joan Gorlick. He did so out of some ill-defined 
feeling of revenge. He had previously expressed feelings of hos-
tility towards appellant which he admitted to while testifying. He 
had made up some fantasy about being an undercover federal agent out 
to get Ms. Gorlick. He also made up a story about his car being 
fixed and not being available when, in fact, it was. On the evening 
of the event, Delgado had apparently just been released from an 
alcoholic ward, was drinking large quantities of alcohol, and mixing 
it with drugs. He apparently also had some sexual problems which he 
held against ~ls. Gorlick. Thus, the following occurred (R. 98): 
"Q. During that four-and-a-half hour period, could you 
generally describe at this point what the conversa-
tion was about between you and Joan and Cal and Paul? 
A. Yeah. Joan seemed to be very amazed and very 
impressed in telling her friends I was a faggot, and 
that was one of the big topics at the table and then 
she tried pushing me on to going to bed with Paul. 
- J J-
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Q. At this conversation? 
A. That conversation and the one that took place at the 
Sun. 
Q. Well, after four-and-a-half hours of hearing that, how 
did you feel? 
A. I didn't care what she was saying. I am what I am. 
Q. But you would still characterize the conversation as 
being a friendly one? 
A. Yes, I would. 
Q. You characterize that kind of conversation as 
friendly? 
A. Yes, I do. 
This response is evidence of the distorted, troubled, confused, 
revengeful witness whose testimony was central to the prosecutio~ 
case. Delgado was an admitted liar, he committed a serious crime 
when he falsely accused Smith for purposes of revenge. He had tt 
same troubled and revengeful motives towards appellant. Under tt 
circumstances, it cannot be said a jury could credit his testimo~ 
and as against multiple witness testimony as to the appellant's 
innocence. Under these circumstances, the jury's verdict was 
unreasonable. 
In Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956), the United 
States Supreme Court considered a similar issue. Defendants were 
charged with violations of the Smith Act (advocating overthrow o: 
the United States) and convicted. The government candidly concec 
before the Supreme Court that the principal prosecution witness, 
Mazzei, might not have been truthful, although contending the te: 
mony given at trial was fully credible. It appeared that Mazzei 
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probably testified falsely before a Congressional Subcommittee and 
other places wrongfully implicating others in Communist associa-
tions. The prosecution sought remand to the lower court to consider 
the credibility of Mazzei. His testimony was described as 
"bizarre", 352 U.S. p. 8. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction 
stating: 
"The question of whether his untruthfulness in these other 
proceedings constituted perjury or was caused by a 
psychiatric condition can make no material difference 
here. Whichever explanation might be found to be correct 
in this regard, Mazzei's credibility has been wholly 
discredited by the disclosures of the Solicitor General. 
No other conclusion is possible. The dignity of the United 
States Government will not permit the conviction of any 
person on tainted testimony. This conviction is tainted, 
and there can be no other just result than to accord 
petitioners a new trial. 
* * * 
"Mazzei, by his testimony, has poisoned the water in 
this reservoir, and the reservoir cannot be cleansed 
without first draining it of all impurity. This is a 
federal criminal case, and this Court has supervisory 
jurisdiction over the proceedings of the federal courts. 
If it has any duty to perform in this regard, it is to see 
that the waters of justice are not polluted. Pollution 
having taken place here, the condition should be remedied 
at the earliest opportunity. 
'The untainted administration of justice is certainly 
one of the most cherished aspects of our institu-
tions. Its observance is one of our proudest boasts. 
This Court is charged with supervisory functions in 
relation to proceedings in the federal courts. See 
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332. Therefore, 
fastidious regard for the honor of the administration 
of justice requires the Court to make certain that the 
doing of justice be made so manifest that only irra-
tional or perverse claims of its disregard can be 
asserted.' Communist Party v. Subversive Activities 
Control Board, 351 U.S. 115, 124. 
"The government of a strong and free nation does not 
need convictions based upon such testimony. It cannot 
-]3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
afford to abide with them. The interests of justice call 
for a reversal of the judgments below with direction to 
grant the petitioners a new trial." 
Although the posture of the instant case is not procedurally the 
same as in Mesarosh, the circumstances are substantively the sarr 
This Court is obligated to protect a defendant from the whims ar. 
foolishness of an unreasonable jury verdict. Whatever pity migh 
felt for the troubled, tortured Mr. Delgado, it should not compc 
the tragic and unreasonble verdict reached in this case. This C 
should reverse. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH BEYOND A REASON-
ABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT TOOK THE PROPERTY ALLEGED WITH 
THE INTENT REQUIRED TO CONVICT FOR THEFT. 
The crime of theft, §76-6-404, U.C.A. 1953, incorporates all 
various legal forms of theft that were known at common-law and 
the law developed by various statutory additions. §76-6-403, U. 
1953. See State v. Taylor, 570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977). The alle~ 
conduct of the appellant was a "taking" of the property of anot~ 
and at common law would have been characterized as larceny, ass, 
the truthfulness of Mr. Delgado's testimony. Under such a form 
theft, the taking at common law would have required that it be • 
intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property or the c 
could not be established, Perkins, Criminal Lav;, 2nd Ed. p. 266; 
Clark and Marshall, Crimes, 7th Ed.§ 12.04 p. 825; LaFave & Sec 
Criminal Law, p. 637; State v. McKee, 17 Utah 488, 58 Pac. 1119 
(1898). As recently stated by the Arizona Supreme Court in Stal 
Ross, 107 Ariz. 240, 485 P.2d 810, 812 (1971): 
"It is true that intent to permanently deprive the owner of 
his possession is an essential ingredient of grand theft." 
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The mere taking of personalty of another does not constitute larceny 
unless there is a felonious intent. A mere trespassory interference 
is not enough. State v. Patterson, 110 Utah 413, 174 P.2d 843 
(1946). The Utah Legislature in the 1973 Penal Code modified the 
common law rule. The required mental state for theft under 
§76-6-404, U.C.A. 1953, is "with a purpose to deprive him thereof." 
§76-6-401(3), U.C.A. 1953, defines the term "purpose to deprive" to 
mean: 
"(a) To withhold property permanently or for so 
extended a period or to use under such circumstances that a 
substantial portion of its economic value, or of the use 
and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a 
reward or other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances 
that make it unlikely that the owner will recover it." 
The common law modification is simply to recognize that a person 
may not intend to permanently deprive the owner or possessor, but 
may intend to act such that the property will be completely or 
substantially lost to the owner or possessor. The provision is 
substantially comparable but not quite identical to §223.0(1) of the 
Model Penal Code. The differences are in style of language and 
completeness rather than substance. See, Utah's New Penal Code: 
Theft, 1973 Utah L.Rev. 718, 744-745. The changes require more than 
a mere "joy ride" with the property, 1973 Utah L.Rev. 745, but 
reg~1re either an intent to permanently deprive, substantial risk of 
loss equivalent to an intent to permanently deprive, or a serious 
loss of economic value. See Model Penal Code Tentative Draft, fl, 
pp. 69-73 (1956). 
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Applying the required standard to the instant case, there is 
evidence of an intent on the part of the appellant at the time of 
the taking, State v. Bender, 581 P. 2d 1019 (Utah 1978), that sati 
fies any of the definitions of "intent to deprive" under the 
statute. According to Delgado, R. 104: 
"Q. Isn't it in fact true that at the Hilton Hotel you 
gave the ring to Joan Gorlick for the purpose of 
having it appraised? 
A. I gave her permission to appraise it at the table and 
she wanted to take it home for the night to appraise 
it, and I told her, 'No.'" 
Thus, the difference between Delgado and the other witnesses 
whether Delgado let appellant take the ring for appraisal over n: 
or at the table at the Hilton. There is no evidence that Ms. 
Gorlick intended to keep it for any long period at all. Any con-
trary suggestion is pure speculation. Delgado knew appellant anc 
knew where to find her. The ring would not depreciate in value c 
undergo economic deterioration or depreciation. There was no 
evidence the ring was taken for reward or that Delgado was un-
likely to recover it. To allow a record as barren as this one tc 
support an inference of an intent to deprive is to ignore the 
evidence to the contrary and to create an irrebuttable presumptic 
that intent to deprive exists in every taking. This would do vic 
lence to the legislative intent and purpose. The evidence 3S it 
stands in the record is totally insufficient to support a concluo 
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had the intent to depri1 
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POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO ESTAB-
LISH APPELLANT'S GUILT OF SECOND DEGREE FELONY THEFT. 
The appellant was charged with theft of property of a value in 
excess of $1000 (R. 13). This is a second degree felony under Utah 
law, §76-6-412 (a), U.C.A. 1953. The prosecution, in order to 
support its contention that the value of the ring in question was in 
excess of $1000, offered the expert testimony of Mr. Milton 
Petersen, a diamond salesman for Schubach Jewelry in Salt Lake 
City. Mr. Petersen testified that in his opinion the ring had a 
retail value on August 1, 1978, of between $1200 and $1400 "full 
retail" (R. 127). However, Mr. Petersen also noted that if the ring 
were purchased as a part of a "keystone" purchase the value would be 
around $500 to $600 (R. 128). Keystone value was suggested as to 
the value to someone with large buying power (R. 128). The victim, 
David Delgado, had put the value at between $300 to $700 (R. 100). 
The ring had been purchased new four years before for a price of 
$275 (R. 101). Cal Smith, who had jewelry experience, had advised 
Delgado the cing was worth between $250 and $300 (R. 188). 
According to Paul Tolman, Delgado and Gorlick in discussing the 
jewelry trade had put a value on the ring around $250 (R. 204.) In 
rendering his opinion on value, Mr. Petersen noted that there had 
been a tremendous increase in the wholesale value of diamonds and 
that the "international money market" had a "tremendous effect" on 
the value of the ring because the dollar goes down in proportion to 
the inflation rate. 
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In State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977), this Court noted 
that the definition of value contained in the Penal Code, §76-6-l 
u.c.A. 1953, did not apply to the value of stolen property. This 
Court stated: 
"In general, the common-law gradation of the offense 
of larceny that is based on the value of the property 
stolen has been retained in most jurisdictions, and in the 
absence of statutes providing otherwise, the measure of the 
value is its fair market value at the time and place where 
the alleged crime was committed. Market value has been 
further clarified as being a measure of what the owner 
could expect to receive, and the amount a willing buyer 
would pay to the true owner for the stolen item. In State 
v. Clark, the court said that to determine whether th_e __ __ 
crime charged is to be petit or grand larceny, the test is 
the market value of the property; that is, the price a 
well-informed buyer would pay to a well-informed seller 
where neither is obliged to enter into the transaction. 
"We accept the market-value test as the appropriate 
test to be used in determining the value of stolen property 
not otherwise provided for in our statute, and the trial 
court correctly stated the law in its jury instructions." 
(Emphasis added). 
Based on the standard in the Logan case, it is submitted the pro; 
cution's evidence failed to establish the value of the ring as b! 
in excess of $1000 as is required to support a conviction for a 
theft felony in the second degree. It appears that Mr. Petersen' 
testimony, although directed to the value of the ring on August 
1978, was never related to the "place". This Court adopted the 
and place standard of market value in the Logan case referenced 
above. This is in accord with the rule from other jurisdictions. 
People v. Kolego, 554 P.2d 712 (Colo.App. 1976): Oldham v. The 
State, 534 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1975); vlise v. The State, 494 S.W.2d 9: 
(Tex.Crim.App. 1973). At no time did the prosecution direct Mr. 
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Petersen's attention to the need to relate value to the place of the 
theft. As noted in Mr. Petersen's testimony, market value on 
diamonds may be based on a worldwide or international market 
standard. It is important that the value of the item being 
appraised be tied to the market for the item at the place where the 
theft occurred and not to some other general or nebulous standard. 
Since the prosecution did not relate the evidence of value to the 
place of the theft, there is no evidence in the record from which 
the jury could have found the value of the diamond ring which was 
the subject of the theft to have been $1000 at the time and place 
where the crime occurred. Therefore, the evidence is insufficient 
to support a conviction for a felony in the second degree. 
In addition, it is submitted that the evidence is insufficient 
for another reason. The crime of theft as defined in §76-6-404, 
U.C.A. 1953, is defined with reference to "the property of 
another". Property is defined in §76-6-401, U.C.A. 1953, as includ-
ing many items including "anything of value to the owner". It is 
submitted that where the evidence of value to the owner is before 
the jury that such a standard governs the value of the item for the 
purposes of determining value under the theft statute. In the 
instant case, the value to Mr. Delgado was no more than $700 
according to the testimony in the record and could have been as low 
as $300. Other evidence corroborates the willingness of Delgado to 
trade the item for other property having a value within the stated 
range. Since the bartering for the ring took place immediately 
before the theft and the value to the owner was established at less 
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than $1000, it is submitted that such value governs over the 
testimony of experts addressing the value of an item in a 
hypothetical marketplace. It is, therefore, submitted that this 
Court should find that the prosecution's evidence was insufficie~ 
to establish the crime of theft as a second degree felony and or~ 
the judgment to be affirmed at no higher level than a third degre. 
felony. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case, when examined against the burden c 
proof on the prosecution to establish the defendant's guilt beyer 
reasonable doubt and, when appraised against traditional standar~ 
of appellate review, was insufficient to establish the appellant' 
guilt. A defendant's guilt cannot be based upon the testimony of 
witness whose credibility has been so thoroughly undermined as wa 
the testimony of the victim in this case. The State of Utah doe: 
not need convictions based on such evidence. 
Additionally, it is submitted that the evidence of the appel-
lant's "intent to deprive" is wholly speculative and insufficient 
meet the legal standards of "intent to deprive" as it is defined 
the Penal Code. At the most, the evidence would support a findir 
that any taking that occurred without the permission of the owne~ 
was a mere temporary trespass and not under circumstances that we 
meet the statutory standard for a theft conviction. Finally, it 
submitted that the evidence of value is insufficient to support a 
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conviction for a second degree felony and that this Court should, at 
the very least, reverse and direct a conviction be entered on the 
basis of a felony in the third degree. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Stanley s. Ad~ms 
Arrow Press Square 
Glass Factory No. 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
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